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Abstract: The aim of this paper is to emphasize to what extent the two 
grand  theories  –  neofunctionalism  and  intergovernmentalism  –  have 
underpinned  and  shaped  the  European  integration  process  since  the 
inception  of  what  is  today  called  the  European  Union.    By  giving  an 
overview of how these two major theoretical streams have been depicted 
in  the  work  of  several  scholars  corroborated  with  some  of  the  most 
relevant historical facts and changes which occurred in the fifth decades 
of European integration, this essay assesses both the evolution of these 
two main theories in the post-war era and their impact on the development 
of  the  European  project  as  envisaged  by  the  founding  fathers  of  the 
European  Community,  Jean  Monnet  and  Robert  Schuman.  These  two 
tenets are useful in providing us with the analytical tools to explain the 
discrepancies in the EU policy-making across different issue areas and 
over time, rather blurred in many regards. 
 
 
For  many  years,  the  analysis  of  the  European 
Community (EC) was actually intertwined with the study of 
the  European  integration  process.  This  analysis  focused 
mainly  on  the  debate  between  the  leading  schools  of 
European  integration,  neofunctionalist  and 
intergovernmentalist,  drawing  from  each  approach  a  set  of 
implications  and  hypotheses  about  the  nature  of  the  EC’s 
policy process. (H. Wallace, W. Wallace & Pollack 2005, 14) 
According to Pollack, “the EU is without question the most 
densely  institutionalized  international  organization  in  the 
world, with a welter of intergovernmental and supranational 
institutions  and  a  rapidly  growing  body  of  primary  and 
secondary  legislation,  the  acquis  communautaire”.  (Pollack 
2004, 137) 
Both  neofunctionalism  and  intergovernmentalism  are 
macro-level  theories  of  international  relations,  which  are 
designed  to  describe,  clarify  and  predict  the  European 
integration  as  a  process.  In  essence,  these  macro      
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frameworks  shed  light  on  what  might  be  called  history-
making decisions. (Peterson 1995, 70)  
It is held that the founding fathers of the EC – Jean 
Monnet,  the  French  Planning  Commissioner,  and  Robert 
Schuman,  the  French  Foreign  Minister  –  were  essentially 
“pragmatic  federalists”  (Laffan,  Mazey  2006,  38).  In  1943, 
David Mitrany published his famous work on the theory of 
functionalism (A Working Peace System. An Argument for the 
Functional Development of International Organization), which 
underpinned in a way Monnet’s and Schuman’s ideas. In his 
advocacy  Mitrany  projected  a  universal,  rather  than  a 
regional  solution,  to  what  he  called  the  “problem  of  our 
generation: how to weld together the common interest of all 
without interfering unduly with the particular ways of each” 
(Richardson 2001, 53). Functionalism is often considered to 
represent the theoretical impulse that preceded the drive to 
European integration. (Rhodes, Mazey 1995, 31)  
Indeed,  the  Community  method  of  functional  integration 
created in April 1950 by Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet, 
proposed that French and German cool and steel production 
should  be  placed  under  a  common,  supranationational 
authority,  the  High  Authority,  which  would  be  responsible 
for establishing a common market for coal and steel among 
the member states. (Laffan, Mazey 2006, 38) 
Neofunctionalism  which  stemmed  from  functionalism 
was first elaborated by Ernst Haas in his book The Uniting of 
Europe.  Coming  up  with  a  new  vision  and  focusing 
specifically  upon  the  integration  project  in  Europe,  Haas 
managed to improve Mitrany’s functionalism and adapt it to 
the  inherent  necessities  with  which  the  EC  had  been 
confronting.  For  Haas  “political  integration  is  the  process 
whereby political actors in several distinct national settings 
are  persuaded  to  shift  their  loyalties,  expectations  and 
political  activities  toward  a  new  centre,  whose  institutions 
possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national 
states”  (Haas  1958,  16).  By  tackling  issues  such  as  the 
importance of supranational institutions and by presenting a 
comprehensive  account  of  how  parts  fit  together, 
neofunctionalism tried to provide a theory of politics which 
focused  mainly  on  regional  integration.  (Rhodes,  Mazey 
1995,  33)  Or,  how  Chryssochoou  clearly  points  out, 
neofunctionalism  is  often  associated  with  Monnet’s      
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functional  fedederalism,  a  term  employed  to  explain  the 
composite  character  of  Monnet’s  gradualist  approach:  a 
miscellaneous synthesis of elements of functionalism (from 
functionalism  the  centrality  of  transnational  actors)  and 
federalism  (the  idea  of  central  institutions),  without  being 
fully in accord with either of them. (Carr, Massey 1999, 12) 
Caporaso avows that a transnational society would be inert 
and ineffective without some form of leadership and that the 
delegation  of  decision-making  authority  to  a  supranational 
agency is vital. (Caporoso 1998, 9)  
Therefore,  the  European  Coal  and  Steel  Community 
Treaty from 1951 signed by France, Germany, Italy and the 
three  Benelux  states  -  Belgium,  Luxembourg  and  the 
Netherlands  -  established  five  main  institutions,  which 
constituted  the  foundation  of  the  present  institutional 
framework  of  the  EC:  a  Special  Council  of  Ministers 
(subsequently,  the  Council  of  Ministers),  a  High  Authority 
(prototype  of  the  European  Commission),  a  78-member 
Common  Assembly  (which  developed  into  the  European 
Parliament),  a  corporatist  Consultative  Committee  (which 
later  became  the  Economic  and  Social  Committee),  and  a 
Court  of  Justice  for  settlement  of  disputes.  (Laffan,  Mazey 
2006, 39)  
However, the feature most closely associated with the 
neofunctionalist  approach  to  the  study  of  European 
integration  and  which  represented  the  most  significant 
advance  upon  Mitrany’s  remains  the  process  of  spillover. 
This  process  could  be  split  into  two  key  components:  the 
sectoral (functional) spillover, which involves the expansion 
of integrative activities from one sector to another (e.g. from 
coal  and  steel  either  to  agriculture  or  harmonization  of 
transport policy or economic policy; from customs union to 
monetary union). (Lindberg, Scheingold 1970, 7) The other 
component,  the  political  spillover,  implies  increasing 
politicization  of  sectoral  activity  as,  for  example,  when  the 
coordination  of  monetary  policies  was  replaced  by  a  more 
centralized system of governance. (Rhodes, Mazey 1995, 31) 
Moreover,  neofunctionalists  predicted  that  sectoral 
integration  would  become  self-sustaining,  leading  to  the 
creation of a new political entity with its centre in Brussels. 
(H.  Wallace,  W.  Wallace  &  Pollack  2005,  14)  The  spillover 
process  is  best  reflected  in  The  Merger  Treaty,  signed  in      
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1965, which successfully blended the three Treaties of Rome 
–  ECSC,  the  European  Atomic  Energy  Community 
(EURATOM) and the European Economic Community (EEC) 
–  which  provided  for  a  Single  Commission  and  a  Single 
Council of the then three European Communities. 
Importantly,  the  snowball  effect  identified  by 
neofunctionalism  was  not  only  limited  to  political  or  to 
sectoral areas, but also referred to a geographical spillover. 
Haas  underlined  that  cooperation  between  one  group  of 
member  states  was  likely  to  have  some  effect  upon  other 
states  and  influence  them  to  join  the  club.    Therefore,  by 
early  1960s,  a  number  of  members  of  the  European  Free 
Trade Association (EFTA) such as UK, Denmark and Norway 
(the  latter  signed  the  treaty  but  failed  to  ratify  due  to  a 
negative  opinion  in  a  national  referendum  on  accession), 
followed  by  Portugal,  Sweden  and  Austria  had  begun  to 
apply for membership of the EEC. (Rosamond 2000, 59) 
The heyday of neofunctionalism corresponded with the 
early  period  of  integration  in  the  EC,  from  the  entry  intro 
force of the Treaty of Rome in 1958 to the completion of the 
customs union in 1968. (Rhodes, Mazey 1995, 31) 
 However, the neofunctionalist theory has been many 
times  cast  into  doubt:  firstly,  when  the  French  president, 
Charles  de  Gaulle,  vetoed  the  UK  membership  application 
(1963  and  1967),  thus  holding  back  the  process  of 
geographical spillover. The second stalemate occurred during 
the  French  empty  chair  crisis  of  1965  that  had  widely 
discouraged the political spillover. The impasse was resolved 
in  January  1966  by  the  Luxemburg  Compromise,  which 
shifted  the  institutional  balance  of  power  away  from  the 
Commission  in  favor  of  the  Council  of  Ministers  and 
confirmed  the  right  of  member  states  to  veto  the  EC’s 
legislative  proposals.  Thus,  de  Gaulle  managed  to  make 
qualified  majority  voting  (QMV)  essentially  meaningless  for 
years  to  come  curtailing  many  federalist  plans  for  the  EC. 
(Laffan,  Mazey  2006,  40)  Finally,  the  oil  crisis  and  the 
commencement  of  worldwide  economic  recession  in  1974 
gave  rise  to  protectionist  temptations  in  many  countries. 
Numerous attempts of national governments to control rising 
unemployment  and  domestic  inflation  levels  brought  also 
into question the relevance of sectoral spillover. (Rosamond 
2000, 60) Furthermore, the disputes around establishing the      
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Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) greatly clarified the limits 
of  Brussels.  The  period  between  1961  and  1965  which 
witnessed  implementation  of  the  CAP  included  measures 
designed  to  control  the  price  of  agricultural  commodities. 
This  laid  it  bare  that  agriculture  is  largely  governed  by 
member  states  (MS).  (Rhodes,  Mazey  1995,  35)  The 
agricultural  issues  are  even  today  a  core  element  of 
bargaining  among  MS.  CAP  could  be  in  many  regards 
considered one of the main foreign economic policies pursued 
by  the  MS  since  the  commencement  of  the  European 
integration  process  (perhaps  together  with  the  adoption  of 
the Euro in 1999). 
The period from the early 1970s to the early 1980s is 
usually considered the “Dark Ages” (Keohane, Hoffman 1991, 
8)  of  the  neofunctionalist  tenet,  being  in  many  regards 
synonym  with  the  stagnation  of  the  EC’s  development. 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that the Community did 
not undergo any process of disintegration as many scholars 
skeptically argued. On the contrary “the EC’s survival with 
so  little  damage  to  its  basic  structure  in  the  face  of  the 
adverse  environment  of  the  1970s  should  be  viewed  as  a 
considerable  achievement.”  (Wallace  1982,  63)  Thus,  the 
Community  accepted  new  members:  the  first  enlargement 
took place in 1973 with the inclusion of Denmark, Ireland, 
and the UK into the EC, whereas 1981 saw Greece becoming 
a member. 
In  spite  of  a  continuous  support  for  the 
neofunctionalist  tenet,  recurrent  crisis  within  the  EC’s 
summits,  deadlocked  meetings  within  the  Council  of 
Ministers  and  the  discordant  relation  between  the  UK  and 
the  rest  of  the  Community  had  strongly  shaken  the 
neofunctionalist arguments. (Laffan, Mazey 2006, 40) 
Stanley  Hoffmann  through  his  intergovernmentalist 
critique  of  the  neofunctionalist  approach  emphasized  the 
importance  of  the  national  governments  and  their  roles  in 
shaping  the  EC’s  structure.  He  underlined  that  national 
governments would always endorse their interests within a 
broader system. In order to show the limits of the functional 
method,  Hoffman  argued  that,  in  fact,  it  was  the  logic  of 
diversity which prevailed and limited the spillover effects of 
the neofunctionalist theory. Hoffmann clearly highlighted the 
dichotomy between low politics, which comprises areas such      
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the  economic  and  welfare  policies  and  the  vital  national 
interests or high politics such as foreign policy, security and 
defense,  where  national  governments  are  less  willing  to 
transfer  their  authority  to  a  supranational  body.  National 
governments  would  try  to  minimize  uncertainty  and  retain 
tight control over decision processes when vital interests are 
involved. As proofs in this sense stand de Gaulle’s actions 
and  also  the  difficulties  raised  by  the  accession  of  new 
members  such  as  the  UK,  Ireland  and  Denmark  whose 
governments  made  it  clear  that  they  would  resist  any 
gradual  transfer  of  sovereignty  to  the  Community.  (H. 
Wallace, W. Wallace & Pollack 2005, 17) Subsequently, both 
the  introduction  of  the  European  Political  Cooperation  in 
1970 – a forerunner of the CFSP which brought together the 
foreign ministers of the EC and marked the beginnings of the 
foreign  policy  coordination  –  and  the  European  Council  – 
which starting from the 1970s played an important agenda-
setting  role  in  the  integration  process  –  were  definitely 
intergovernmentalist bodies. (Laffan, Mazey 2006, 40) 
Hence, the neofunctionalist tenet dominated the early 
period  of  integration,  but  it  soon  became  obvious  that  its 
predictions were insufficient to explain the ebbs and flows of 
the integration process.  
Hoffman’s theory was criticized by the neofunctionalist 
contributions of Sandholtz and Zysman, who argued that in 
the run-up to the Single European Act (SEA), the European 
Commission  played  a  crucial  leadership  role,  acting  as  a 
policy entrepreneur. Backed up by a transnational industry 
coalition which was in favor of a single market, the dynamic 
Commission  under  Jacques  Delors  was  able  to  induce  the 
MS  the  idea  that  the  market  unification  was  beneficial. 
(Rosamond 2000, 64) Another decisive role was played by the 
European  Parliament’s  work  presided  by  Altiero  Spinelli 
which led to the negotiations of the SEA. (Armstrong, Bulmer 
1998, 31) In other words, “what the SEA accomplished, in 
institutional terms, has been the dramatic revival of a largely 
supranational  decision-making  style  that  was  lost  after 
1966”. (Wallace 1990, 280)  
However, Andrew Moravcsik holds that the 1987 SEA 
represented in fact the turning point in the development of 
the  EC  and  saw  the  complete  replacement  of 
neofunctionalism  with  the  intergovernmentalist  tenet.      
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Moravcsik  claims  that  the  interstate  bargains  between 
Britain,  France  and  Germany  determined  the 
implementation  of  the  SEA.  This  was  achievable  only 
because  the  three  main  pillar  states  within  the  EC  had 
convergent national interest.  
According  to  Moravcsik,  the  member  states  have 
always  guarded  their  national  interests  and  placed  strict 
limits on any future transfer of sovereignty. Thus, they tried 
to  avoid  granting  supreme  authority  to  central  institutions 
that  could  weaken  their  sovereignty,  preferring  instead  to 
work  through  intergovernmental  institutions  such  as  the 
Council  of  Ministers.  (Moravcsik  1991,  27)    “The  state 
behaviour  reflects  the  rational  actions  of  governments 
constrained  at  home  by  domestic  societal  pressure  and 
abroad  by  their  strategic  environment”  (Moravcsik  1993, 
474).  The  integration  process  did  not  supersede  or 
circumvent  the  political  will  of  national  leaders;  in  fact,  it 
reflected their will. Moravcsik claims that the impetus for MS 
to integrate did not aim to avoid future geopolitical disputes 
in  Europe  or  follow  the  American  federalist  model,  but  to 
coordinate  policy  responses  to  rising  opportunities  for 
profitable  economic  exchange,  in  particular  growing  intra-
industry trade and capital movements. (Moravcsik 1998, 6) 
Moravcsik’s assertion could be coupled with the state 
centrist  perspective  advocated  by  Hooghe  and  Marks,  who 
argue  that  EU  membership  preserves  or  even  strengthens 
state  sovereignty.  From  their  standpoint,  supranational 
institutions exist just to facilitate agreements between MS. 
“The interests of the MS’ executives shape policy outcomes, 
not those of the supranational actors.” (Cafruny, Lankowski 
1997, 21)  
In addition to that, Kassim emphasizes that this kind 
of  negotiations  are  present  even  within  a  supranational 
institution  such  as  the  European  Commission.  Bargaining 
may  take  place  within  a  Directorate  General,  between 
Directorate Generals or between commissioners themselves. 
Inter-institutional  interaction  also  occurs  between  the 
Commission,  the  Council  and  the  European  Parliament. 
(Kassim 1994, 27) 
After  sifting  the  data  available  on  these  two  grand 
theories, it seems that since the late 1980s, when the SEA 
came into force, it is rather difficult to affirm which tenet has      
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clearly left its mark on the policy process. What is obvious is 
that  the  role  and  influence  of  intergovernmentalism 
increased,  especially  in  vital  moments  such  as  those 
preceding important agreements, whereas neofunctionalism 
maintained  its  relevance  when  dealing  with  more 
bureaucratic,  administrative  decisions.  “State  executives 
play a decisive role in drafting the basic treaties and major 
legislation  underlying  the  EU,  such  as  the  SEA  and  the 
Maastricht  Treaty,  but  they  are  far  less  dominant  in  most 
areas of day-to-day policy-making”. (Marks 1996, 352) 
On  the  one  hand,  in  order  to  support  the 
intergovernamentalist  perspective  it  should  be  mentioned 
that  state  representatives  are  the  only  legally  recognized 
signatories of the treaties of the EU. “Treaty making is the 
realm  of  negotiation  among  national  leaders,  the  national 
veto,  and  side-payments  to  bring  recalcitrant  national 
governments on board.” (Marks 1996, 352) To back up the 
intergovernmentalist  tenet  it  is  interesting  to  notice  how 
ardently  the  MS  wished  to  preserve  their  own  cultural, 
political and constitutional features, a point clearly made in 
Art.  (1),  Treaty  of  the  European  Union:  “The  Union  shall 
respect  the  national  identities  of  MS,  whose  systems  of 
government  are  founded  on  the  principles  of  democracy”. 
(Chryssochoou,  Tsinisizelis  1999,  14)  This  “respect  for  the 
national  identity”  is  very  well  preserved  especially  in  key 
moments when intergovernmental decisions are taken under 
unanimity, during the treaty-amending negotiations or when 
dealing  with  decisions  in  the  European  Council.  By  and 
large, these kinds of decision are relevant for the second and 
third  pillar  of  the  EU,  the  Common  Foreign  and  Security 
Policy (CFSP) and for fostering cooperation within the Justice 
and Home Affairs (JHA) pillar. (Wiener, Diez 2004, 83) With 
regards to CFSP, the intergovernmentalist bargaining is more 
than obvious if we take into account that “there is a usual 
great  sensitivity  among  most  governments  about  foreign 
policy  as  a  special  domain  in  which  national  concerns 
dominate international or European interests” (Smith 2000, 
614).  In  comparison  to  the  EU’s  first  pillar  (European 
Communities  pillar)  where  Brussels  has  the  capacity  to 
impose  explicit  demands  on  its  members  in  the  form  of 
treaty articles, secondary legislation, court cases in different 
socio-economic  areas  of  the  integration  project,  CFSP  does      
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not  have  the  competence  to  impose  change  on  MS  foreign 
policies. (Smith 2000, 613) 
One the other hand, seeking to demonstrate that the 
neofunctionalist  approach  is  not  obsolete  some  experts 
advocate that the EU institutions can and do have an impact 
that  goes  beyond  the  interstate  bargain  by  shaping  MS’ 
interests,  by  defining  the  paths  of  political  influence  and 
even  by  becoming  players.  “Once  states  created  an 
international  organization  with  independent  powers,  they 
have brought to life a creature that is, because it possesses 
autonomy,  not  entirely  under  their  control.”  (Sandholtz 
1996, 408)  Firstly, the Commission has autonomous powers 
to  enforce  the  EU  rules  which  can  disallow,  for  instance, 
governments  from  providing  subsidies  to  industrial 
enterprises. The Commission can also stop the progress of 
corporate  mergers  and  acquisitions  that  would  result  in 
diminished competition within the EU market or implement 
anti-trust  rules.  Secondly,  the  European  Court  of  Justice 
also plays an important role in the enforcement of the EU 
laws either when MS appeal against Commission actions or 
when it supports the Commission in disputes with MS, thus 
strengthening the supranational rule-making. 
The  intergovernmentalist  reply  would  be  that  MS 
accept  only  as  much  independence  on  the  part  of  the  EU 
bodies  as  is  consistent  with  their  long-run  interests. 
Otherwise,  the  institutions  exist  only  to  serve  in  an 
instrumental  way  the  interests  of  the  states.  (Sandholtz 
1996, 409-411) 
A concept that is worth looking into is the concept of 
Europeanization,  which  since  the  1990s  has  attracted 
renewed  attention  from  political  scientists  specializing  in 
European  integration.  The  Europeanization  process  reveals 
in  a  suggestive  way  the  interconnectivity  between  the  two 
grand theories. Thus, Europeanization is seen as a two-way 
interaction  between  the  national  and  the  European 
(Papadimitriou, Phinnemore 2003, 3) or, in other words, as a 
merger  of  the  top-down  (neofunctionalism)  and  bottom-up 
(intergovernmentalism)  approaches.  This  portrays 
Europeanization  as  “an  ongoing,  interactive  and  mutually 
constitutive  process  of  change  linking  national  and 
European  levels,  where  the  responses  of  the  MS  to  the      
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integration  process  feed  back  into  the  EU  institutions  and 
policy processes and vice versa” (Major 2005, 177). 
In  conclusion,  the  remark  held  by  Keohane  and 
Hoffmann  that  the  EU  “is  an  experiment  in  pooling 
sovereignty, not in transferring from states to supranational 
institutions”  seems  very  eloquent,  when  debating  the 
relevance of the two tenets. In contrast to other international 
organizations, the EU as a whole has gained some shares of 
states’ sovereignty. On the one hand, the MS no longer have 
supremacy over all other authorities within their traditional 
territory,  which  was  lost  in  favor  of  the  EU’s  institutions. 
Hence,  these  could  be  considered  some  of  gains 
neofunctionalism  achieved.  (Keohane,  Hoffman  1991,  277) 
However,  several  compromises  between  the  supranational 
institutions  and  the  MS  and  the  difficulty  of  reaching 
consensus at the EU level, on the other hand, pointed out 
the relevance of intergovernmentalism. 
To  rank  the  above-mentioned  theoretical  perspective 
according to the righteousness of their arguments brought to 
the  fore  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  paper.  It  has  to  be 
underlined  that  the  competition  between  the  two  tenets 
diminished  in  the  last  two  decades  and  other  integration 
theories emerged such as the new institutionalism, network 
analysis and the multi-level governance. These new theories 
carry  additional  explanations  to  how  the  European 
integration  process  is  being  shaped.  In  the  end,  the  point 
made by Moravcsik seems edifying: “Any general explanation 
of  integration  cannot  rest  on  a  single  theory, 
neofunctionalism or intergovernmentalism, but must rest on 
a  multicausal  framework  that  orders  a  series  of  more 
narrowly  focused  theories”  (Moravcsik  1998,  15)  –  a 
conclusion echoed to the present day. 
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